Triodos 🐼 Investment Management

XYLEM INC

MEETING DATE	Wed, 10 May 2017 11:00 am	TYPE	AGM	ISSUE DATE	Thu, 04 May 2017
MEETING LOCATION	Xylem World Headquarters, 1 International I York 10573	Drive, Rye	e Brook	, New	
CURRENT INDICES	S&P500				
SECTOR	Pumps and pumping equipment]

	PROPOSALS	ADVICE
1a	Re-elect Curtis J. Crawford Independent Non-Executive Director.	
1b	Re-elect Robert F. Friel Independent Non-Executive Director.	For
1c	Re-elect Sten E. Jakobsson Independent Non-Executive Director.	For
1d	Re-elect Steven R. Loranger Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as he served President and Chief Executive of the ITT Corporation, from which the Company spun-off in 2011, and also served as Interim President and CEO of the Company from September 2013 to March 2014. There is sufficient independent representation on the Board.	For
1e	Re-elect Surya N. Mohapatra Independent Non-Executive Director. He is chair of the Nomination Committee and less than 20% of the Board are women which Triodos does not support.	Oppose
1f	Re-elect Jerome A. Peribere Independent Non-Executive Director.	For
2	Appoint the Auditors Deloitte proposed. Non-audit fees represented 6.38% of audit fees during the year under review and 5.10% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.	For
3	Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The compensation rating is: CCC. For fiscal 2016, annual cash awards were not excessive, with overall pay levels below peer group	Abstain

averages. However, the CEO's maximum opportunity exceeds 200% of his base salary which is not considered best practice. With respect to PSUs, the TSR vesting scale is insufficiently broad to ensure superior awards reflect superior performance as executives may receive payouts for below median performance. Essentially rewarding the executives for performing below average. In addition, whilst the amount of reward derived from stock options is determined by share price growth, the awards of options have no performance conditions attached. Thus an increase in share price over the lifespan of an option (and falls are unusual) can reward executives even in circumstances of poor relative performance.

Triodos abstain this resolution.

4 Approve an amendment to the Company's Articles of Incorporation to Allow Shareholders to For Amend the By-Laws

The Company has put forward a resolution requesting shareholders to approve an amendment to the Company's Third Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation to provide shareholders with the right to amend the Company's By-laws. Currently, the Company's Articles of Incorporation and By-laws provide that only a majority of the Board may amend the Company's By-laws. The Company reached out to shareholders representing approximately 60% of the Company's outstanding shares to obtain feedback on their views regarding the right of shareholders to amend by-laws, engaging in discussions on this topic with shareholders representing more than 20% of the Company's outstanding shares.

No serious governance concerns have been identified. The proposal does not reduce shareholder rights.

Triodos supports this resolution.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR RESOLUTIONS

Proposal 3 - Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has achieved: an average level of disclosure; an average balance for rewards; and an average approach to contracts with executives.

Disclosure: C- Annual cash incentives are based on revenue, operating income and working capital. The Company granted long-term incentives in the form of performance share units (PSUs), time-based restricted stock units (RSUs) and stock options. PSUs are based on three-year absolute return on invested capital (ROIC) metric (25%) and three-year relative total shareholder return TSR metric (25%). Specific targets are disclosed.

Balance: C- For fiscal 2016, annual cash awards were not excessive, with overall pay levels below peer group averages. However, the CEO's maximum opportunity exceeds 200% of his base salary which is not considered best practice. With respect to PSUs, the TSR vesting scale is insufficiently broad to ensure superior awards reflect superior performance as executives may receive payouts for below median performance. Essentially rewarding the executives for performing below average. In addition, whilst the amount of reward derived from stock options is determined by share price growth, the awards of options have no performance conditions attached. Thus an increase in share price over the lifespan of an option (and falls are unusual) can reward executives even in circumstances of poor relative performance.

Contract: C- The Company has adopted double-trigger vesting upon a change of control for severance plans and Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) awards.

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Researcher: Irene Tsopanoglou Email: pircresearch@pirc.co.uk

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Pensions & Investment Research Consultants Limited 8th Floor, Suite 8.02, Exchange Tower 2 Harbour Exchange Square E14 9GE

> Tel: 020 7247 2323 Fax: 020 7247 2457 http://www.pirc.co.uk

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